Abstract-The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates the annual cost from cybercrime to be more than $400 billion. Most notable is the recent digital identity thefts that compromised millions of accounts. These attacks emphasize the security problems of using clonable static information. One possible solution is the use of a physical device known as a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). PUFs can be used to create encryption keys, generate random numbers, or authenticate devices. While the concept shows promise, current PUF implementations are inherently problematic: inconsistent behavior, expensive, susceptible to modeling attacks, and permanent. Therefore, we propose a new solution by which an unclonable, dynamic digital identity is created between two communication endpoints such as mobile devices. This Physically Unclonable Digital ID (PUDID) is created by injecting a data scrambling PUF device at the data origin point that corresponds to a unique and matching descrambler/hardware authentication at the receiving end. This device is designed using macroscopic, intentional anomalies, making them inexpensive to produce. PUDID is resistant to cryptanalysis due to the separation of the challengeresponse pair and a series of hash functions. PUDID is also unique in that by combining the PUF device identity with a dynamic human identity, we can create true two-factor authentication. We also propose an alternative solution that eliminates the need for a PUF mechanism altogether by combining tamper resistant capabilities with a series of hash functions. This tamper resistant device, referred to as a Quasi-PUDID (Q-PUDID), modifies input data, using a black-box mechanism, in an unpredictable way. By mimicking PUF attributes, Q-PUDID is able to avoid traditional PUF challenges thereby providing high-performing physical identity assurance with or without a low performing PUF mechanism. Three different application scenarios with mobile devices for PUDID and Q-PUDID have been analyzed to show their unique advantages over traditional PUFs and outline the potential for placement in a host of applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identification is the act of claiming an identity. An identity is a set of attributes (authentication factors: something you know, something you have, and something you are), both physical and perceptual, that uniquely defines a specific entity. Authentication is the act of confirming an identity based on presented attributes. The authentication of an identity provides a specific level of identity assurance (i.e., the entity is most likely the entity it is claiming to be). In modern Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000 society, identification and authentication occur remotely using computing devices: an entity will provide a set of attributes, specific to the identity it is claiming, whereby a remote server authenticates the claim. As an example, an employee for a corporation remotely logs into the corporate network using a login ID and password. These identity specific attributes can be easily intercepted and cloned over network communications. The limitations of existing authentication factors built on static identity information have been reviewed in [1] . With the increase in storage and transactions related to sensitive information (e.g., financial data), the consequence of identity misrepresentation can be disastrous [2] - [4] . Therefore, the reliance on static identity information creates a challenging security problem. Two methods have been proposed on this paper to overcome the limitation of relying on static identity information: software-based security and hardware-based security.
A variety of software-based security solutions have been provided for identification and authentication [5] - [9] . The most common is the use of encryption [10] . An encryption key can be used to securely store and transfer sensitive data (e.g., identity attributes). However, the problem is that the encryption key itself needs to be securely stored or transmitted [11] . It should be noted that software-based security solutions are also prone to tampering [12] and the encrypted channel is susceptible to crypto-analysis and man-in-the-middle attack.
Hardware-based security techniques build upon softwarebased techniques and encompass a wide variety of technological innovations: random number generators [12] , encryption key generators, smart cards [13] , biometrics [14] , etc.. The hardware-based security solution that is most pertinent to this paper is a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) [15] , [16] .
PUFs are based on unique, random, and complex characteristics inherent in physical structures consisting of billions of clustered molecules and/or atoms. PUFs can be used to create security applications such as random number generators, encryption key generators, and unique physical IDs. However, there are certain technical challenges associated with PUF usage: granular environmental control (e.g., temperature, power flow, pressure) and pure energy source generation (e.g., clean laser frequency or high precision electrical power source), exposure of challenge-response pair (CRP) at the manufacturing facility as well as minimization of size, weight and power, and cost to manufacture and deploy. Because of these technical challenges, PUF responses can deviate from the norm, increasing the cost of acquiring consistent and predictable responses. Additionally, the security guarantees provided by PUFs can be difficult to quantify.
In this paper, we present two related authentication meth-ods: Physically Unclonable Digital ID (PUDID), which uses PUF behavior as a macroscopic phenomenon, and Quasi-PUDID (Q-PUDID), which use PUF-like emulated functions. By combining the physical device identity with a dynamic human identity, we can create true two-factor authentication: something you know and something you have.
PUDID and Q-PUDID authentication leverage the following security techniques:
• Unique features of the dynamic behavior of a material or hardware at a macroscopic scale
• Separation of the CRP via a physically hard to clone, cost prohibitive private key
• Combination of multiple blinding functions to create an unclonable dynamic ID
• Tamper-resistant digital devices where data modifying physical attributes are stored
We focus on combining inexpensive, pluggable components that have PUF attributes that are difficult and/or expensive to reproduce. In this manner, PUDID and/or Q-PUDID devices are able to circumvent the previously stated technical challenges associated with classical PUF devices. These authentication methods are highly resistant to cloning and simulation attacks due to the separation of the CRP and the use of a series of hash functions to blind data.
The remainder of this paper provides a description and analysis of related work, a detailed description of the PUDID and Q-PUDID architecture, example applications, advantages, and a concluding section.
II. RELATED WORK
To date, there has been a wide range of research that is similar to many of the facets of PUDID. Specifically, many different PUF devices have been proposed: non-electronic PUFs [17] - [20] , electronic PUFs [21] , [22] with responses based on analog measurements, intrinsic PUFs, and PUF concepts [23] - [26] . Optical PUFs [17] , [18] and their integration with CMOS, provide a solid foundation for inexpensive pluggable PUF components. This concept of inexpensive pluggable PUF components has been easily extended by PUFFIN [27] .
PUFFIN aims to find PUF-based devices that are economical and easily pluggable (e.g., CPUs and GPUs). This includes evaluating the capabilities of standard PCs, mobile phones, and other low-cost consumer electronics based on their PUF capabilities. The secondary focus in subsequent PUFFIN development phases is to provide use cases and applications for the PUF-based instances previously located and qualified. One such use case is to provide identification and authentication onthe-fly using added cryptographic protocols to avoid man-inthe middle attacks. However, no implementations have been provided for the authentication use case, let alone anything comparable to PUDID.
In the work by Lee et al. [28] , the authors modify the Time-Based One-Time Passwords (TOTPs) concept described by M'Raihi et al. [29] . TOTPs use a One-Time Password (OTP) generator to produce a response created using timestamp information. This response is then used to authenticate a user. The authors modify this process by using a PUF in the OTP generator process to prevent cloning. They mention that the proposed protocol prevents the eavesdropping attack because sensitive information is hashed. However, the process differs dramatically from PUDID in that we propose the astute chaining of hash functions to be used as input for a PUF device. Moreover, the TOTP authors' approach relies on only the TOTP to perform authentication, whereas our process involves using multiple pieces of identification information with the added inclusion of an ephemeral session ID.
Most PUF designs focus on the population of a CRP database in order to correctly match challenges and responses. However, there are two main drawbacks associated with this technique: CRP exhaustion and securing the original device for repopulation. Model-based PUFs [30] - [33] avoid these drawbacks by computing CRPs instead of populating a CRP database. Specifically, Duren et al. [32] propose a system that uses a recombination function to avoid collecting the responses in a provisioning phase. This technique shares a distinct similarity with the specialized "brain" provided in our PUDID solution. However, the authors propose a recombination function that is based on PUFs using Ring Oscillators. This approach suffers from the same drawbacks as other integrated PUF designs and specifically contrasts to our work, which focuses on pluggable PUF and PUF-like components using macroscopic phenomena (e.g., Optical PUF).
In the work by Guajardo et al. [34] , the authors propose a system of integrating public-key cryptography such that a private key stored in a FPGA never has to leave the device. This is a major component of the physicalization of public-key cryptography and is important due to the problems associated with software-based public-key cryptography. Additionally, their work points toward the use of intrinsic PUFs to mitigate the issues associated with other integrated PUF designs. While their work serves as a stark contrast to software-based publickey cryptography, it still displays many inherent vulnerabilities associated with relying on the use and generation of public and private keys.
Maiti et al. [35] propose a system of increasing the number of CRPs using an identity-mapping function based on measuring the frequency difference between two Ring Oscillator pairs. The advantage is that a PUF limited by its capabilities can produce a high-level of security without increasing manufacturing costs. This is similar to Q-PUDID in that we are proposing a device that guarantees a high-level of security even in the face of a low-performing PUF.
The PUF device most relevant to our work is the Public-PUF (PPUF) [25] , [26] , [30] . Beckmann and Potkonjak [25] discuss the physicalization of public key protocols using PUF. Specifically, their implementation uses integrated circuits such that easily measured delays of PPUF gates serve as a public key. This public key can be used by a simulating party to simulate output for some input. It is important to note that the authors address PUF stability issues by placing gates as close as possible or only using the PUF when delay changes are consistent. Ultimately, this solution provides suboptimal stability by continuing to rely on nano-scale measurements.
While all of the related work provides various implementations and theoretical research for a specific aspect of the problem, our research provides a flexible and novel alternative solution to the overall problem of relying on clonable static information.
III. PUDID ARCHITECTURE
The first three options are unlikely candidates for PUF capabilities due to the lack of interactive techniques for picking up molecular/atomic level variances. To provide PUF capabilities using these techniques would be costly and complex. Electromagnetic waves and electric current are therefore the most suitable options. However, PUFs have inherent technical challenges: pure energy source generation, granular environmental control, uncertainties in error corrections, and costly manufacturing process. PUDID provides digitally unclonable hardware identification through the following mechanisms:
• Injecting PUF and PUF-like capabilities
• Separating the CRP where the challenge component resides in identified hardware and response component is in authenticating entity
• Executing a series of digital hashes to prevent I/O analysis
• Dynamically communicating the signature of hardware and human identity thereby addressing MITM and replay attacks
The two methods we look towards enabling these mechanisms through are Optimized PUF and Tamper Resistant Mechanisms with PUF-like attributes. Of the possible PUF solutions, image processing offers compelling options: an optical lens can be turned into a PUF, a small optical PUF can be inserted between the camera lens and its electronic components or the image sensors can be turned into PUFenabled hardware. Furthermore, by highly structuring and simplifying input images, one can envision building a highly efficient CRP response algorithm. Optimized PUFs focus on macroscopic phenomena that produce reliable results and low manufacturing costs.
An alternative solution can be provided that eliminates the need for a PUF mechanism altogether by combining tamper resistant capabilities with a series of hash functions. This solution avoids traditional PUF challenges by instead mimicking PUF attributes, while also eliminating the negative authentication attributes of PUFs. A tamper resistant device can be built such that synchronized dynamic data enters a black-box and is modified unique to device in an unpredictable way, producing a uniquely modified pattern. This tamper resistant black-box, which is shown in Figure 1 , is referred What is unique to a Quasi-PUDID is that nano-scale measurements can be avoided while still retaining PUF-like abilities. A tamper resistant function is also used to emulate physically unclonable PUF features while eliminating undesirable features (PUF noise, aging, environmental variation). In other words, a Quasi-PUDID is designed to provide highperforming physical identity assurance with or without a low performing PUF mechanism.
Classical PUF solutions provide a CRP that is vulnerable to identity exposure: 1) at a PUF manufacturing facility, 2) a challenge and response are provided on a singular device. By separating the CRP at the two communication endpoints (i.e., PUF ID generator at the sender's device and pre-populated CRP algorithm at the receiving end), one can minimize exposing the digital identities to cryptanalysis. PUDID provides true two-factor authentication: something you know and something you have (i.e., a human identity is intertwined with a PUF device). In order to create large mathematical barriers to cryptanalysis, a series of hash functions are used during this intertwining process to create an unclonable, dynamic ID.
IV. EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS

A. Uniquely Identify Using Optical PUF
A PUF-enhanced sand-blasted glass filament is fitted between a camera lens and its optical sensors. An image is taken with and without the optical PUF (i.e., the optical PUF scrambles the image). A specialized brain (e.g., deeplearning algorithm) can be built to map the two images such that the scrambled image can be interpreted as the original, unscrambled image. As illustrated in Figure 2 , this system regenerates randomly scattered photonic images back to the original form. The specialized algorithm can be hardwired into the device using FPGA, which will make for the perfect CRP. The optical PUF scrambles the image and only the corresponding brain can unscramble or rebuild the image. With this system, verification of the integrated optics device can be provided. Moreover, this application can be extended to not only verify a device, but also verify a user.
B. Uniquely Identify End-User and Phone
Assume that Bank A issues a mobile phone (i.e., a built-in PUF mechanism) that can act as an ATM device for Bob. Bank A wants to make sure that Bob's money is only accessible by Bob and only through Bob's mobile phone (i.e., using twofactor authentication: what you know and what you have). As illustrated by Figure 3 , using a PUDID to send information works in the following manner:
Bob:
1) Bob authenticates himself to the phone (e.g., using a login ID and password) 2) The phone hashes the login ID and password in volatile memory producing hash 0 3) The phone takes hash 0 , timestamps the data, and combines that data in hash 1 4) hash 1 is passed through a PUF (e.g., an optical PUF consisting of sand blasted glass fiber) that creates a uniquely scrambled output 5) The scrambled hash 1 output, unique device ID, login ID, and current timestamp are packaged to create an authentication request file Bank A: 1) One of Bank A's servers receives the sender's authentication request file 2) Bank A's server has a database of Bob's hashed login ID and password (i.e., hash 0 ), which is combined with the timestamp from the authentication request file to produce hash 1 3) Bank A's server also has a database of device IDs which can be used to find the corresponding CRP FPGA device to unscramble the scrambled hash 1 output that was received in the authentication request file 4) The unscrambled hash 1 value is compared to the generated hash 1 value; if the two values are identical, the identity of Bob and his mobile phone are authenticated
C. Uniquely Identify End-User and Phone using Q-PUDID
The Q-PUDID model is an extension of PUDID that is designed using the Quasi-PUDID. This model can be used in the previous scenario where we want Bank A to issue a mobile phone that can act as an ATM device for Bob. As illustrated by Figures 4, 5 , and 6, using a Q-PUDID to send information works in the following manner:
Bank A: 1) Bob authenticates himself to the phone (e.g., using a login ID and password) 2) The phone hashes the login ID and password in volatile memory producing hash 0 3) Bob requests a connection to a Bank A server 4) Bank A's server sends the ephemeral session ID hash time to Bob's phone 5) The phone takes hash 0 , hash time , and the timestamp, and runs it through the optimized Quasi-PUDID device embedded in the mobile phone 6) The Quasi-PUDID device scrambles the data and hashes the scrambled data once more producing hash 1 7) The scrambled hash 1 output, device ID, login ID, and timestamp are packaged to create an authentication request file Bank A: 1) One of Bank A's servers receives the sender's authentication request file 2) Bank A's server has a database of device IDs and Bob's hashed login ID and password (i.e., hash 0 ), which is combined with the escrowed ephemeral session ID hash time , and the received timestamp, which is scrambled using Bank A's escrowed Quasi-PUDID device 3) The scrambled data is hashed to produce hash 1 4) The hash 1 from Bob and the Bank A generated hash 1 are compared; if the two hashed values are identical, the identity of Bob and his mobile phone are authenticated
The differences between this Q-PUDID scenario and the , and 6, the differences can be noted: that in optimized optical PUDID, PUF scrambled data is sent in the raw format while in Q-PUDID, the device takes extra steps to hash the PUDID "Scrambled" data prior to sending it outside of Q-PUDID device to authenticating entity.
V. ADVANTAGES
Traditional PUFs have numerous inherent problems: costly, difficult to produce reliable results, vulnerable to cryptanalysis, scalability, and significant potential for identity exposure at a PUF device manufacturing and distribution points. PUDID and Q-PUDID are technological innovations that provide specific and novel advantages over classical PUF mechanisms:
• Uses simple, inexpensive, macroscopic, and pluggable PUF components to produce reliable and difficult to reproduce results
• Q-PUDID leverages PUF-like capabilities, as illustrated by Figure 1 , by using a tamper resistant device that modifies input data, using a black-box mechanism, in an unpredictable way (i.e., Q-PUDID produces high performing physical identity assurance even with a low performing PUF mechanism)
• Intertwines a dynamic human component with a unique, physically unclonable device (i.e., true twofactor authentication). Both factors must be true in order for each factor to be taken as truth.
• Q-PUDID Device ID is never exposed to any third parties in its manufacturing process
• Uses a combination of a series of hash functions to produce high mathematical barriers to cryptanalysis
• Randomness can be controlled by modifying the hash size and CRP, offering assurance level calculations
• Separates the CRP; traditional PUF devices produce a response on the same device, exposing it to cryptanalysis
• Makes it possible to physicalize the public/private key model; the PUF hardware acts as the private key and the CRP is the public key; CRP algorithm leakage will not compromise the identity of the device as it is physically impossible and/or cost prohibitive to manufacture that specific device VI. CONCLUSION Physically Unclonable Digital ID (PUDID) is a technological innovation that provides an unclonable, dynamic hardware identity between two (i.e., Optimized Optical PUDID) or multiple (i.e., Q-PUDID) communication endpoints. PUDID uses optimized PUF devices, and in the case of Q-PUDID, tamper resistant mechanisms with PUF-like behaviors, to scramble data unique to physical device that corresponds to a uniquely matching descrambler (PUDID) or device signature verifier (Q-PUDID). Using hash functions at carefully placed points in the creation of the physically unclonable ID, we can create large mathematical barriers for cryptanalysis. A true two-factor authentication system is achieved by intertwining a dynamic human component with an optimized PUF device: an attacker must not only know the human component but also steal the owner's unique Q-PUDID device.
We have demonstrated PUDID and Q-PUDID applications, as well as discussed the unique advantages over traditional PUFs. These advantages have the potential to place PUDID in a host of consumer applications: set-top boxes, gaming consoles, satellite communication, and unclonable mobile phone identification.
